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PRESENTATION BY PROFESSOR 
WENDY J. GORDON 
PROFESSOR GORDON: 
As you know from the paper I submitted, I am going to explicate 
two models that I think underlie a good deal of intellectual property 
discussion. From my experience, the more clear you are about underly-
ing models the easier it is to pull them apart, show their inadequacies, 
or show ways in which they are useful but need to be supplemented. Of 
the two I want to identify, the first is something I have called "asym-
metric market failure," which I think would be uncontroversial once 
understood, but I think is not often understood. The second is some-
thing called the prisoner's dilemma game, which I think you will recog-
nize yourselves as having used for years, as it provides the underlying 
structure of a traditional argument for copyright, even though you may 
never have heard of the game theory literature out of which it evolves. 
This latter comment is addressed to some extent to the practitioners; I 
am sure my academic colleagues are aware of the prisoner's dilemma 
game, though perhaps not in this context. 
Let me begin by explaining asymmetric market failure. An asym-
metric market failure is present when two events or conditions con-
verge. The first condition is that authors and inventors would not be 
able to obtain much payment for their work in the absence of a rule 
that restrained· strangers from copying. In other words, the first condi-
tion is that creators would face a market failure in the absence of a 
legal rule that requires copyists to seek permission and pay license fees. 
The second condition for asymmetric market failure is that once a 
' no-copy rule is put in place, licensing will evolve. In other words, this 
second condition is met if, in the presence of a copyright or some other 
rule restraining strangers from copying, markets will succeed, not fail. 
The first condition, that authors face market failure in a world 
without copyright, is important because of incentives. If, in the absence 
of a no-copy rule, a potential creator would expect competitors to copy 
her work and undersell her, she may refrain from creation in the first 
instance, so that the public gets less creative work than it really would 
be willing to pay for. 
It is this kind of market failure that copyright and patent are in-
tended to cure. When it is asked why have copyright or any other intel-
lectual property rules in the first place, the usual answer given is the 
public goods problem; that is, that it is hard to exclude free riders. And 
the law provides, as Jerry [Reichman] says, little bitty fences around 
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each bit of intangible property: It gives you an ability to exclude free 
riders from u~ing your work. 
The first condition in asymmetric market failure addresses this dif-
ficulty the creator has in excluding nonpayors. Copyright economic pol-
icy assumes that if you are in a world that doesn't have rules against 
copying, you are going to have insufficient fences. That logic implies, in 
turn, that if you are going to try to get a court or legislature to make 
new rulings against copying, it should be because your current fences 
are insufficient. In other words,, to make a good case for intellectual 
property in an area, the facts should suggest that a potential creator, 
who has some claim to be paid, based on morality or economics or any-
thing else, needs the courts to act on her behalf, and could not get paid 
otherwise. If the money could be forthcoming even without an intellec-
tual property rule in place,· why get courts and legislatures involved 
with all that expensive process? 
Thus, the first condition of asymmetric market failure addresses 
the question of whether an intellectual property system is needed in the 
first place. The second condition for asymmetric market failure ad-
dresses whether the intellectual property system will ~e practicable, 
and really provide the incentives desired. 
As you will recall, this second condition was that under copyright 
markets would evolve-that users under copyright wouldn't face mar-
ket failure. This consideration is· also clearly relevant to incentives, for 
monetary payments will not come to creators unless potential users are 
able to bargain around the law's restrictions and pay for licenses or 
copies. No matter how otherwise desirable it may be to have a copy-
right system, a lot of the arguments in favor of that system from an 
economic perspective fall fl.at on their face if you are not going to have 
markets, because then the people who have the copyright aren't going 
to have customers and they are probably not going to have incentives, 
and the rest of the world isn't going to get the use of the intellectual 
product. So as I suggested in an article on copyright's fair use doctrine, 
if a defendant faces market failure in the face of copyright, that is a 
good argument (if not a complete one) for not enforcing the copyright 
against him. 
If markets do not evolve for a particular creative work or use-say 
for example that bargaining is impeded by problems such as externali-
ties, high transaction costs, or the impossibility of identifying the copy-
right proprietor-then if the copyright laws prohibited copying in that 
area it would simply be preventing copying without yielding creators 
any monetary advantage. That would be undesirable. Not only would 
copyright then fail to perform its primary function, but if users can't 
reach market deals with creators, copyright would impose more costs 
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and generate less benefit than would a regime without copyright. For in 
a world without copyright, incentives may be low, but at least copyists 
and other users would have access to whatever works happened to be 
created; by contrast, in a world where there is copyright b.ut no mar-
kets, incentives are low and the public has no access. Therefore the 
ability of users to form markets is crucial to copyright's economic mis-
sion of encouraging the production of new work to· serve the public 
weal. · 
The ability of users to form markets under copyright is also impor-
tant for another reason: administrative costs. Let us say that after hav-
ing supposedly cured the first market failure-the public goods prob-
lem-by setting up a system of intellectual property rights, Congress 
decides to cure any secondary market failures that arise that could 
block licensing of the copyrighted works. So perhaps transaction costs 
- block licensing in a particular industry, and the legislators cure the 
market failure by setting up a scheme like compulsory licensing, or by 
explicitly authorizing courts to give continuing damage remedies; in 
cases like that the law is "making a market" of sorts. For example, the 
compulsory licensing scheme may eliminate bargaining difficulties by 
imposing a mandatory license fee, and the fee becomes the "price." 
Similarly, a court that allowed an infringing use to continue while 
awarding a damage remedy or a reasonable royalty would basically be 
setting up a compelled license. But these schemes are much more ex-
pensive and cumbersome than ordinary markets are. 
Also, because their administrative costs are high, there will be 
gaps in coverage: such devices will not be set up wherever their admin-
istrative costs outweigh the benefits of a given license. These devices 
are also likely to be imperfect market mimics, for nothing calls forth 
accurate revelation of preferences and costs like a real bargaining situ-
ation does. Therefore, for example, even as to a class of uses covered by 
a compulsory license scheme, some sort of particular uses that would 
occur in a perfect market will not happen. 
Considering the administrative costs of these market substitutes, it 
may be that an intellectual property regime that faces significant mar-
ket barriers won't generate enough economic incentives to be worth 
pursuing even if the lawmakers are committed to surmounting these 
barriers. Not only might the administrative costs cancel out much of 
the incentive gains, but incentives themselves may be low because some 
potential uses will remain unexploited. 
So where does this leave us? I argue that it shows us that intellec-
tual property rights are most easily justified when the two conditions of 
asymmetric market failure converge: Where intellectual property is 
necessary to cure a tnarket failure faced by authors, and where, after 
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the law adopts an intellectual property system, users do not face mar-
ket failure in their search for licenses. Under such conditions, the allo-
cative gains for an intellectual property system are likely to be: high, 
and the administrative costs of the system are likely to be low . 
. , When the two conditions of asymmetric market failure obtain; au-
thors face a market barrier that copyists do not. In a world where lack 
of copying restrictions leads to market failure, authors cannot easily get 
paid-for example, they may not even know who the potential copyists 
might be and, therefore, could not negotiate with them. Yet, if in a 
world that has copying restrictions, copyists can form markets, they are 
not stymied. For example, if copyists know who owns the work they 
wish to reproduce, they may be able to bargain for the right to do so. 
Licensing can evolve. 
I'd now like to move to the second half of my presentation: the 
prisoner's dilemma model. That model is related to what I just covered, 
and I would like to spend a moment making the connections explicit. 
As you will recall, the first prong of my asymmetric market failure 
test addressed the question of whether intellectual property is really 
necessary to provide adequate incentives. Commentators like Stephen 
Breyer and Tom Palmer have suggested there are situations in which 
authors can obtain payment even without a copyright system in place, 
and much debate centers on the extent to which intellectual property 
protection is really necessary in various industries. The second part of 
my pres.entation addresses the issue of when authors without copyright 
are most likely to face significant market failure. As I'll suggest, situa-
tions in which the prisoner's dilemma is present are situations in which 
the economic need for legal intervention is likely to be strong. 
Thus, to tie the two parts of the discussion together: A copyright 
proponenf will want to show that without intellectual property, creators 
would face market failure that would erode their incentives to create. 
The prisoner's dilemma, when present, presents a set of powerful incen-
tives not to create. Where it is present, a prima facie case of author 
market failure is made out. 
Prisoner's dilemm·a comes from game theory. Game theory essen-
tially investigates how rational actors would behave under a variety of 
specific constraints, usually consisting of a pattern of payoffs that each 
player will receive from a particular configuration of player choices. 
The closer the constraints of a given game conform to real-world condi-
tions, the more helpful the game will be in predicting real"-world behav-
ior, and the more useful experiments in changing the payoffs of that 
game will likely be in yielding information about how to change that 
real-world behavior. The game which has probably had the greatest 
influence. on legal scholars is the prisoner's dilemma. In fact a multi-
1992] PRESENTATION OF PROFESSOR GORDON 875 
person prisoner's dilemma is taught to virtually every first-year student 
today in his or her property class under the title 'tragic commons.' 
Prisoner's dilemma is a game where each of the. two participant 
players is likely to be better off if she is_ empowered to join with the 
other to constrain their mutual choices by some means, by, for exam-
ple, law. Thus, though it may not always happen that way, each is 
likely to be better off if they can constrain their choices than each is 
likely to be if both are at liberty to respond to the initial payoff pattern 
as unconstrained individuals. The prisoner's dilemma pattern accord-
ingly is used both to explain and to justify certain legal constraints. 
The justificatory argument goes basically as follows; note it has 
one aggregative and one individualistic strand. If unconstrained incen-
tives in a particular context would lead to mutually destructive behav-
ior, the introduction of legal constraints into that context can be under-
stood as a rational way to increase aggregate productivity. Second, on 
the individualistic side, if the constraints serve the parties' individual 
long-run interests, then it may be fair to treat each party as having 
given implied consent to the constraints, even if in the short run one of 
the parties finds it irksome. 
Admittedly, prisoner's dilemma may be more harmful to the group 
than to individuals-some players are able to save themselves, albeit at 
the expense of the player opposite them. Therefore, the first strand (ag-
gregative) tends to be stronger. Nevertheless, the game suggests why 
people may give consent to being constrained. The literature is full of 
variations of implied consent, from Locke to Rawls and beyond. But all 
of those implied consent locutions have a concern with looking to the 
welfare or interest or preferences of the people affected rather than 
some outside third party, like a king; therefore, something that helps 
individuals be better off in the long run is susceptible to justification 
under a wide range of legal theory and political theory. 
The prisoner's dilemma game gets its name from the heuristic 
commonly used to illustrate it. Imagine two prisoners who had joined 
together to pull a heist and have gotten arrested. The prosecutor has 
some evidence against each, but not enough to be conclusive on the 
severest charge that the acts of the two would warrant. Say, for exam-
ple, that if both stay silent, cooperating with each other and denying 
the prosecutor any additional information, each can expect a short jail 
term of eighteen months. That's the basic starting point. 
Now assume tha~ each prisoner is in a separate cell and they can 
not communicate with each other. Each is approached by the prosecu-
tor and told the following: If she rats on her pal and the pal stays 
silent, the prosecutor will dismiss the charges against the informant 
and use the proffered information to convict the pal for the maximum 
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term, nine years. Conversely, the prosecutor also tells her that if she 
refuses to rat and her pal rats, then she will go to jail for the maximum 
and her pal who confessed will go free. If both rat, the prosecutor says, 
he will use the information against each, but in return for their 
forthcomingness will send them to jail for only a moderate term, say 
five years. 
What often happens in plays of this game is that both players rat 
on each other. Now, if both players rat, both are worse off than if they 
had cooperated with each other and stayed silent because they are both 
in jail for five years instead of the eighteen months they would have 
each received if they stayed mum. To avoid this result it is necessary to 
change the payoff stru.cture. One reason we might not allow binding 
keep-silent contracts between two criminals in jail is because we would 
not want to change their payoff structure. But the game can be genera-
lized well beyond that context to places where you do want people to be 
able to constrain their choices-as by binding contracts or by rules of 
property or tort-so they will do things that yield maximum benefit for 
themselves. 
Just to formalize for a moment, imagine a blackboard which I 
don't have. Take out your pens if you don't mind; this will make it 
easier to follow what I am about to say. It will be a matrix showing the 
payoffs that constitute the classic prisoner's dilemma, and here I am 
following Charles Goetz's version. 
Across the first horizontal line would be the payoff you get if you 
cooperate; across the second horizontal line would be the payoff you get 
if you defect. By defect I mean you rat to the cops. 
PROFESSOR LITMAN: The second is what? 
PROFESSOR GORDON: You're cooperating, first horizontal 
line; you are defecting, second horizontal line; each line is under each 
other. 
Your reward for cooperating or defecting will be affected by what 
the other prisoner does. So you also make two vertical columns. The 
first shows what happens to you if the other player cooperates, that is, 
he keeps silent, and the second vertical column shows what happens if 
the other player defects, that is, if he rats. 
By the way, for intellectual property purposes, what I mean by 
"cooperation" is making your own independent work rather than copy-
ing; a "defection" will be copying. We will get there in a minute. We 
should first finish the generalized model. 
By now you have four boxes formed by the intersection of the hori-
zontal anCl vertical lines. In the upper ·left hand corner, for example, 
you'll put the payoff you will get if you and the other player both 
cooperate. 
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In the cooperate/cooperate box put A, if you don't mind. That's 
just a symbol. In the heuristic I gave you a minute ago, cooperate/ 
cooperate means you are both silent and both go to jail. for eighteen 
months. So A equals minus a year and a half in that version of the 
game. In the box under it, where you are defecting and the other player 
is keeping mum, he is cooperating, put B. What is your yield in that 
box? In the prisoner's context, you go free, which is a fairly high re-
ward. So B equals freedom or zero years in jail. Now, in the box where 
you are cooperating but the other is defecting, which is in the upper 
right hand corner, put C, and your payoff for C in the prisoner context 
is that you are going to jail for nine years. Beneath that, in the fourth 
box put D. That's defect/defect, the payoff to you when you both rat. 
Since you would both then go to jail for five years, D is a. payoff of 
minus five. 
Formally speaking, the constraints of prisoner's dilemma are that 
B is greater than A; D is greater than C; A is greater than C; B is 
greater than D; and A plus A is bigger than the sum of any alternative 
pair of payoffs the two players could achieve. Basically what that 
means is this: Defecting is the dominant strategy; both parties may be 
led to defect in a context where mutual defection makes them both 
worse off than mutual cooperation; and had they both cooperated, the 
aggregate welfare of the pair would have been higher than it is under 
the other options. 
Getting back to an example in intellectual property terms, cooper-
ation means creating your own individual work. Defecting means copy-
ing the other person's work. A prisoner's dilemma situation results 
when th~re are two parties, each a potential creator or a potential copy-
ist, who face the following set of circumstances. First, creation of a new 
work is expensive, but it is cheap to copy the work and make it into a 
new product. Second, investing in the creation of a new work will more 
than pay off its investment, so long as no copying occurs. (By the way, 
we all realize this doesn't always happen, and a prisoner's dilemma is 
present only where these various circumstances are fulfilled, where they 
match the real world.) Third, if copying occurs the creator will lose all 
his investment. This is plausible because the copyist, being free of crea-
tion costs, may be able to charge less for the product than the person 
whose efforts first produced it. If the creator's and the copyist's prod-
ucts are identical, consumers will presumably purchase the cheaper 
one. 
Now, if these circumstances are present, they in turn might pro-
vide the following specific payoff structure. If both parties cooperate, 
that is, they opt to create their own works independently, then both 
parties reach their own audience, and both prosper. That's A: like the 
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robbers going to jail for only a year and a half. Their payoff on the 
prosperous path is, let us say, to choose an arbitrary number, a hun-
dred dollars profit each. 
If both parties opt to be copyists, that is, if they both defect, there 
will be' nothing to copy. The payoff of each is, therefore, zero. That is 
the box we labeled D, and in the other example it was equal to going to 
jail for five years. 
If one party creates and the other copies, that is, one cooperates 
and one defects, the cooperative creator loses his investment, which is 
like going to jail for nine years in the other example. This is box C, and 
it gives the cooperator a payoff of minus 450, assuming that's how 
much it costs him to create the thing initially. (Ignore marketing costs 
for this example.) At the same time, the copyist makes a very large 
profit. 
Let's say the original work cost 450 dollars to make and a creator 
without competition would have earned a gross revenue of 550 dollars, 
giving him a profit of a hundred dollars. Along comes the copyist, and 
since he is free of the 450 dollar creation cost, assume he sells at a 
lower price and takes the entire market-making, let us say, a total of 
530 dollars. So had the party we are looking at chosen to be a copyist, 
and had the other party chosen to be a creator, the payoff in box B 
would be 530 dollars in profit. That's like being released from prison in 
the prior scenario. 
In the circumstances set out above, choosing not to be a creator 
becomes the dominant strategy. The reason is clear: there is a huge 
potential loss associated with creating, you have lost your 450 dollar 
investment in the creation cost; and there is a huge potential gain of 
530 dollars associated with copying. Now, if this is true, both parties 
looking rationally to the future may opt to be copyists. After all, even if 
they both position themselves to copy and achieve zero payoff, that is a 
lot better than losing their shirts, which is what happens if someone 
creates and then is a victim of somebody else's piracy. Yet had both 
been cooperating creators, they would be better off, as would society 
which contains their potential customers. 
To cure this situation, the law creates various anti-copying rules in 
the. form of doctrines such as copyright and pa tent. These legal regimes 
alter the relevant payoffs, and in so doing discourage copying and en-
courage investment in creative activity. 
In the original form of copyright, 1790, American copyright 
tracked the prisoner's dilemma model quite closely. Authors were pro-
tected only against copyists whose sales would be most likely to be 
competitive and undermine the author's incentives-there was no right 
to control performances of one's work, public displays of that work, or, 
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most important for our purposes, the making of derivative versions .of 
one's work. For example, abridgements were not infringing back then 
so long as they were bona fide abridgements addressing a different 
market from one's own. In fact, one of the early abridgement cases, 
Folsom v. Marsh, helped give rise to the doctrine we now know as fair 
use, and this is fitting, for fair use is practically the only copyright 
doctrine where current law shows special solicitude for the creative de-
fendant, that is, the defendant who is not competing and has high costs 
of his own. Today the creative copyist is most likely to be treated as an 
ordinary infringer. 
The most obvious illustration of this change is that copyright today 
grants authors extensive rights to control the making of derivative 
works. As a result, it protects creators in situations where no prisoner's 
dilemma is present. For example, where a copyist is making a creative 
use of a creator's book in an unexpected and noncompeting field, as 
where a producer uses the plot of a novel as the basis for an exercise in 
a new art form, the costs of making that novel into the new product are 
very high. That is, costs of copying are not cheap, so that even without 
copyright protection, the payoff for copying in box B is not extraordina-
rily high. Also, the original author is likely to face no resulting de-
crease in the sales of her book, quite the contrary, in fact. Her books 
sales are likely to rise from the publicity. Therefore the payoff in box t 
isn't as negative as it would be in a prisoner's dilemma. Nevertheless, 
the producer today must bargain for the adaptation rights or face the 
author's wrath in court. 
The reasons for Congress granting this expansive set of rights may 
be tied to the same notions of personality as arguably underlay the 
Court's preference for creativity in Feist. That was Jerry's [Professor 
Reichman's] speculation. On that I offer no opinion. ·1 think it may be 
part of the reason but not all of it. But the divergence between pure 
prisoner's dilemma and copyright's coverage does at least suggest that 
·there may be some merit to the Court's holding that something other 
than piracy of valued labor need be shown before one can invoke the 
copyright act's extensive grant of rights and remedies. That is, if copy-
right rights and remedies give coverage in situations where the need for 
incentives is less acute than it is under prisoner's dilemma, it doesn't 
seem right to use a claimed need for incentives, standing by itself, to 
invoke the act's protection. 
Dennis Karjala argues that copyright should make all acts of 
' piracy infringements, regardless of the creativity of the \YOrk that is 
pirated. By piracy, I think Dennis has in mind something like the clas-
sic prisoner's dilemma. You will see various pieces of his paper all con-
verging on that point. That is, in his examples where he sees piracy and 
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favors liability, the following circumstances tend to conjoin: there are 
two competitors; usually, one is a creator whose investments in creativ-
ity are high; one is a copyist who copies at low cost and undersells the 
creator; the creator is ruined; and the prospect of such events deters 
creation ab ante. This looks remarkably like the prisoner's dilemma 
pattern outlined. But however consistent with copyright's 1790 struc-
ture Dennis' proposal might be, the proposal does not sit easily within 
the current copyright law. Clearly that is something he already recog-
nizes, but I find it troubling to mix the two kinds of arguments as 
freely as his suggestion might lead us to do. 
What is the importance of prisoner's dilemma? Does it really illus-
trate anything? One thing it does, is to suggest why so many scholars 
have insisted on keeping competition between the parties a prerequisite 
for suit under misappropriation law, because when you do not have 
competition between the parties you do not have a prisoner's dilemma 
payoff structure which is so destructive to incentives. Also the pris-
oner's dilemma suggests explanations for several other areas in the law. 
For example, it suggests rights are only needed where the costs of copy-
ing are low. That's one explanation for why trade secret law permits 
reverse engineering. It is an instance where costs of copying are quite 
high so you're not going to have the same kind of temptation that can 
lead to a destructive prisoner's dilemma spiral where people are being 
tempted to copy, or other persons are afraid to be creative, because 
copying looks so easy. 
The bottom line question might be: Do I believe prisoner's di-
lemma is a necessary and sufficient basis for copyright protection? 
Clearly not. For example, free speech concerns could counsel against 
granting rights over copying even where a prisoner's dilemma is pre-
sent. Conversely, there may be noneconomic policies favoring copyright 
that policymakers find· persuasive independent of prisoner's dilemma 
and other incentive arguments. But I must leave the discussion of the 
other issues of concern to other fora rather than go into them here. The 
point about prisoner's dilemma is a fairly narrow one. If a policymaker 
is concerned about allocative efficiency, and wants to encourage people 
who are creative to use their resources to produce things of value, the 
arguments for protection tend to be high from that one particular pol-
icy perspective when the facts show prisoner's dilemma. When the facts 
do not show a prisoner's dilemma, then that particular kind of argu-
ment-about incentives being so threatened that society needs legal 
protection-just does not fly as well. In the absence of a prisoner's di-
lemma situation, something else-whether it is another form of eco-
nomic argument, or arguments based on personality theories, reward 
theories, corrective justice, or yet other policies-must be looked to to 
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for an explanation of why the courts might be giving protection. In 
short, the absence of a prisoner's dilemma situation means one must be 
more suspicious about claims that market failure justifies judicial or 
legislative interpretation. Thank you. 

